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On ‘The Horniman Walrus’ 
Abstract 
This article considers the connections between a walrus displayed in The Horniman Museum in South 
East London and international environmental law. Drawing on my experience of reproducing this walrus 
in clay, it uses the walrus as a microcosm of international environmental law’s engagement with nature 
in the context of cultural and philosophical trends involving the artifactualisation, socialisation and 
humanisation of nature.   
1. Introduction 
This article presents a nineteenth century taxidermy walrus as a microcosm of international environmental 
law’s engagement with nature. The first two sections after this introduction (‘Tea and Philanthropy’ and 
‘The Walrus’) consider the origins of the museum in which the walrus is displayed and the history of the 
walrus itself. The third section (‘Natural / Artifactual’) considers this particular walrus’ existence as 
something that is both natural and artifactual, whilst the fourth section (‘Subject / Object’) connects this 
natural / artifactual existence with the fundamentals of capitalist and anti-capitalist post-Enlightenment 
thought.  
The fifth section (‘Language / Law’) links the natural / artifactual existence of the walrus, understood 
in the context of the preceding discussion (in the fourth section) of post-Enlightenment thought, with the 
vision of nature emerging out of the language of international environmental law, via Walter Benjamin’s 
work on the nature of language. The final section (‘Art / Nature / Simulacrum’) reflects on the apparent 
impossibility of returning to nature, drawing on my experience of making a clay model of the walrus.   
The six substantive sections that follow this introduction can be seen as ‘fragments,’ individual pieces 
in the article’s overall ‘mosaic.’1 My aim, in this article, is to collect these fragments together,  to ‘show’ 
rather than ‘say,’2 to ‘allow’ the fragments ‘to come into their own: by making use of them.’3 I will not, 
therefore, attempt to tell you, as reader, what you should take from this article or how its sections fit 
together. Instead, ‘I must ask you to join me in [what may, at first, seem like] the disorder’ of its mosaic,4 
uncovering its meaning(s) in the process of reading.5    
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2. Tea and Philanthropy 
The Horniman Museum is in Forest Hill, South East London. Its origins lie in the collecting habits of 
Frederick John Horniman (1835-1906), ‘a Victorian tea trader and philanthropist’. Horniman wanted to 
‘bring the world to Forest Hill’, returning from his travels with objects that ‘seemed to him likely to 
interest and inform those who had not had the opportunity to visit distant lands'. Over time his collection 
grew to fill the family home, leading his wife to demand “either the collection goes or we do”. The family 
duly moved out and the house opened to the public as a free museum in 1890. The collection was initially 
‘divided into two sections – Art and Nature’.6 
The Horniman Tea Company – Frederick was chairman and managing director, succeeding his father – 
was the first to sell tea in packets rather than as loose-leaf.7 This prevented adulteration by the merchant 
and erected a barrier between the foreign origins of the tea and the domestic consumer, ‘sanitizing 
products that had come from the “dirty” empire’ by labelling them with the identity of an English dealer 
(‘Horniman’s Pure Tea’).8  
3. The Walrus 
The Horniman Walrus probably came from the Hudson Bay area of Canada. First shown at the Colonial 
and Indian Exhibition in South Kensington, London in 1886, it was subsequently purchased by Frederick 
Horniman. Perhaps its most distinctive feature is that it is ‘over-stuffed’. A walrus ‘in the wild’ has skin 
folds but the Horniman Walrus has none. The taxidermist appears to have unwittingly removed them in 
the process of (over-)stuffing.9  
The over-stuffing would not have been apparent to a visitor in the late-nineteenth century – as the 
Horniman Museum website notes, ‘[o]ver one hundred years ago, only a few people had ever seen a live 
walrus, so it is hardly surprising that ours does not look true to life’ 10  – but it has, over time, become 
central to the walrus’ brand, the (metaphorical) packaging, distinguishing this animal exhibit from other 
animal exhibits. The over-stuffing makes the walrus part natural history exhibit, part artifact, 11 
manifesting a “refus[al] to choose between knowledge and pleasure.”12 The Walrus is, it seems, ‘so 
popular because it is not actually correct … people just learned to love him for being funny looking.’13  
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‘He’ went on tour in 2013, visiting the Turner Contemporary Gallery in Margate, Kent, as part of the 
‘Curiosity: Art and the Pleasures of Knowing’ exhibition.14  Promoting the brand, the Horniman Museum 
website refers to ‘[o]ur famously over-stuffed walrus’, whilst Turner Contemporary invites visitors to ‘see 
the absurdly over stuffed Horniman Museum walrus.’15 ‘He’ even has his own twitter account so that 
‘you can … catch up with the walrus’ own comments’,16 and – perhaps inevitably – the soft toy version is 
available from the gift shop.17  
4. Natural  / Artifactual  
In the preceding sections I have described the museum in which the walrus is housed and the walrus 
‘him’-self. I want, now, to highlight the connections between the packaging of the tea, which, of course, 
gave Frederick Horniman the resources to buy the walrus, and the more recent branding of the walrus, via 
museum and gallery websites and a twitter feed, as uniquely and entertainingly ‘over-stuffed’.  
The nineteenth-century packet containing the tea was, as noted above, the surface onto which the 
brand (‘Horniman’s Pure Tea’) was printed. Through a process of ‘brand recognition’ the consumer 
develops an attachment to something more artifactual than natural.18 Branding – the process of stamping a 
name onto a packet and advertising its contents – stimulates an attachment not to the raw, natural form of 
the thing itself, but to the complete artifact, the unity of the packet and its contents, the product, so that 
the consumer is not buying mere tea but ‘Horniman’s Pure Tea’ and, crucially derives pleasure from 
doing so.19  
The branding, the packaging, appearance, outer surface or skin of the product, seems to be the most 
important element for the consumer. It makes the raw product into something more distinctive and 
pleasurable than it originally, naturally was, divorcing the artifactual product from the natural, raw 
material. We could merely ‘know’ what the natural original was – the dried leaves of a tea plant, the 
preserved body of a dead walrus – but the packaged, presented, re- / de-formed product can be enjoyed as 
a something distinctive, a source of ‘pleasure’.20 
The natural is, then, packaged, re-presented, and given a social-cultural function – the culture of tea 
drinking in English society,21 the curiosity and amusement provoked by a de-formed walrus. Just as the 
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foreign-ness of tea was displaced, in the nineteenth century, by stamping an English dealer’s name onto 
the packet,22 the natural-ness of the walrus is displaced by its over-stuffing. These things in their more 
pure forms would not, it seems, cause interest or pleasure. Tea does not just need to be pure, the word 
‘pure’ needs to be stamped on the packet, so that you can take pleasure from the knowledge that you are 
buying something ‘pure’. A dead walrus that was just a dead walrus would not merit attention – indeed, it 
would decay, smell and offend the senses – but, artificially preserved by taxidermy and ‘placed’ in 
distinctive, over-stuffed packaging, via a twitter account and an accessible socio-cultural history, it 
becomes a saleable product (including in the gift shop, in soft toy form), a collectable item.23 ‘Order’ is 
imposed; an ‘old world’ is renewed.24  
5. Subject / Object 
In their raw, natural forms tea and the walrus seem unfamiliar, unclean, foreign, ‘outside’, and perhaps 
threatening. Packaging, however, sanitizes and humanizes them, making them knowable, unique, 
enjoyable and valuable. 25  The physical processes of packaging and taxidermy have theoretical-
philosophical equivalents – indeed, they are an expression of the humanisation and socialisation of the 
natural central to post-Enlightenment thought in its capitalist and anti-capitalist (or Marxian) forms.26  
Capitalism depends on a process of identification in which incommensurable, individual things or 
people (objects) are stripped of their individuality and identified with other things or people.27 These 
things or people are then introduced into a collective system – a collection, a market – where they are 
bartered or exchanged on the basis of their identity, their equivalence.28  
A productive, economic system depends on modes of thinking (engaged in by subjects) which 
establish similarities between dissimilar things and people (objects) and, with the passage of time, this 
system comes to dominate thinking itself.29 ‘Economic and social forces take on the character of blind 
natural powers’ as the socio-economic becomes second nature and occludes any more primal sense of the 
natural.30 The subject – the thinker – becomes constrained, in her engagement with the object (the thing(s) 
she seeks to think about) by the system within which she thinks, because ‘ideas, aspirations, and 
objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are … 
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repelled … reduced to terms of this universe … [and] redefined by the rationality of the given system and 
of its quantitative extension’.31  
In capitalist terms, then, nature can be thought of only from within the system, in socio-economic 
terms. Nature is ‘mere material, mere stuff to be dominated, without any other purpose than that of this 
very domination.’32 The natural enters the socio-economic realm, the market, only as a labelled product or 
artifact. The tea plant growing in the fields of India or China becomes ‘Horniman’s Pure Tea’ and a 
walrus, shot in Hudson Bay, Canada, and bought with the proceeds of selling that tea, becomes a 
‘famously over-stuffed walrus’ in South East London. Dried tea and a dead walrus are, by means of the 
money passing through Frederick Horniman’s hands, exchanged.  
Marxian, anti-capitalist thought is equally rooted in a socialised concept of the natural in which the 
subject (the thinker) dominates the object (that which is thought about, nature). As Andrew Feenberg 
explains, Marx approached ‘human consciousness [as] a moment in nature’s self-development and not an 
external spectator on the latter’ within a broader concept of ‘subject-object identity.’33 Summarising ‘the 
Marxist view’, Alfred Schmidt explains that ‘[t]he concept of nature cannot be separated, either in 
philosophy or in natural science, from the degree of power exercised by social practice over nature at any 
given time’.34 Even at the most critical, nature-focused end of the Marxian perspective Max Horkheimer, 
writing on ‘The Revolt of Nature’, is clear that no ‘return to nature’ is possible: ‘Whenever man [sic] 
deliberately makes nature his principle, he [sic] regresses to primitive urges … we are the heirs, for better 
or worse, of the Enlightenment and of technological progress … The sole way of assisting nature is to 
unshackle its seeming opposite, independent thought’.35  
Ultimately, therefore, neither capitalist nor anti-capitalist thought offers a way beyond the socialisation 
and humanisation of nature. The centrality of that socialisation-humanisation process to thought is 
reflected in the fundamentals of language itself, and in the language and structure of international 
environmental law. 
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6. Language / Law 
Walter Benjamin ‘On Language’ 
In his 1916 essay ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’ Walter Benjamin reflects on the 
nature of language.36 He does so ‘on the basis of the first chapter of Genesis’, not because he is interested 
in ‘biblical interpretation’ or because he sees the Bible as some source of ‘revealed truth’, but because of 
a conviction that language itself is ‘an ultimate reality’.37 The reality of language is ultimate because it 
expresses ‘the linguistic being of things’, something Benjamin illustrates by reference to a lamp that is, it 
seems, sitting on the desk at which he writes.38  
Benjamin explains that ‘[t]he language of this lamp … communicates not the lamp (for the mental 
being of the lamp, insofar as it is communicable, is by no means the lamp itself) but the language-lamp, 
the lamp in communication, the lamp in expression.’39  The point, it seems, is that no engagement with, 
communication concerning, or expression of ‘this lamp’ is possible outside language – ‘mental being 
communicates itself in language and not through language’40 – and, in that sense, the lamp exists within 
the ‘ultimate reality’ of language.    
Out of Genesis, and with a particular focus on ‘the Fall’, Benjamin discerns and juxtaposes two types 
of language. The first, ‘language as such’, which existed before the Fall, was ‘paradisiacal’, a language of 
‘perfect knowledge’.41  Man, as created by God, was ‘invested with the gift of language and … elevated 
above nature.’42 God ‘did not wish to subject him to language, but in man God set language, which had 
served him as the medium of creation, free’, so that ‘[m]an is the knower in the same language’ – 
‘language as such’ – ‘in which God is the creator’.43  
This ‘paradisiacal’, divine, ‘fully cognizant’ and natural language, 44  with a direct, ‘immediate’ 
connection to the creation and nature of all things, is lost in ‘the Fall’.45 The ‘apples’ of the ‘Tree of 
Knowledge’ in the Garden of Eden ‘were supposed to impart knowledge of good and evil’, but ‘[t]he 
knowledge to which the snake seduces … is itself the only evil known to the paradisiacal [pre-Fall] 
state’.46 ‘Knowledge of good and evil … is a knowledge from outside’ and it is this outside-ness that 
marks ‘the true Fall of the spirit of language’. 47  ‘The word’ becomes ‘something externally 
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communicating… a parody … of the expressly immediate creative word of God’ that had been ‘set’ in 
man by God.48      
Even before the Fall nature is ‘mute’ because it had been subjected to man by God, and because, 
unlike man, it had not been invested with the capacity for language.49 ‘After the Fall,’ however, nature’s 
‘other muteness,’ its “deep sadness,” ‘begins’.50 ‘To be named’ – to be subjected to man – ‘even when the 
namer is godlike … blissful’, invested with a divine, immediate, perfectly truthful language, ‘remains an 
intimation of mourning’, but that mourning is compounded when, after the Fall, nature is subjected to ‘the 
hundred languages of man’.51  
In summary, then, in its pre-Fall state nature was truly and perfectly communicated in language by 
man. This was not a form of socialisation or humanisation but the divine order of creation, the truth. After 
the Fall, however, language lost its divine connection with nature as it fragmented into ‘the hundred 
languages of man.’ This separation of human from divine lays the ground for the socialisation and 
humanisation of nature within ‘prattl[ling]’ languages that facilitate ‘the enslavement of things’ – of 
nature – ‘in folly’.52  
My aim in offering this account of Benjamin’s 1916 essay is not, consistent with Benjamin’s stated 
aim,53 to suggest that the story of the Fall is literally true. It is, rather, to endorse Benjamin’s claim that 
language has become an ‘ultimate reality’, disconnected from nature through processes of socialisation 
and humanisation, allegorised in the taking of the apple from the Tree of Knowledge in the Garden of 
Eden,54 which language – as ‘ultimate reality’ – enacts. That process is enacted through the language of 
international environmental law; an artifactual, socialised, humanised nature is ‘enslaved’ within, and by, 
the language of international environmental law,55 just as the Horniman Walrus was packaged, socialised, 
and humanised in, and by, over-stuffing. 
The Language of International Environmental Law  
The usual story is that international environmental law began at some point in the early 1970s, the most 
commonly cited point of origin being the 1972 Stockholm Declaration.56 Principle 1 of that Declaration 
manifests the ‘enslavement’ of nature within the concept of an ‘environment’ in relation to which ‘Man’ 
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has rights,57 declaring ‘Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, 
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.’58 This language 
of rights and entitlement is replicated in the 1992 Rio Declaration which, in its Principle 1, affirms that 
‘[h]uman beings … are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature,’59 and in Article 
24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, affirming the right of ‘[a]ll peoples … to a 
general satisfactory environment favourable to their development.’60  
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea divides oceans on which humans literally 
(rather than in the more legal-technical sense of not being entitled to make a claim) lack standing into 
various jurisdictional areas – territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf – for primarily 
economic reasons connected with trade, shipping and natural resource exploitation (fish, oil, gas).61 This 
artifactualisation, socialisation and humanisation of nature into a socio-economic system is also captured 
in the text of the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna 
(‘CITES’).62 Its preamble notes the ‘ever-growing value of wild fauna and flora from aesthetic, cultural, 
recreational and’ – perhaps most importantly – ‘economic points of view’, and affirms the ownership of 
‘peoples and States’ over ‘their own wild fauna and flora’, noting that they are ‘the[ir] best protectors’. 
CITES does not question or challenge the basic process of socialisation, humanisation and 
artifactualisation – it is not a block on trade in endangered species per se.63 This is reflected in the fact 
that even those species at greatest risk from extinction – to be listed in CITES Appendix I – are not 
exempt from trade altogether, but can be traded only ‘in exceptional circumstances’.64 Despite CITES 
socio-economic logic – that is, its broadly pro-trade orientation – some commentators have argued that a 
more concerted effort to see flora and fauna as an economic resource is required.65  
The inscription of the English Lake District in the World Heritage List – that is, the list of World 
Heritage Sites, maintained by the World Heritage Committee, operating within the framework of the 
World Heritage Convention – in July 2017 highlights the blurred line between valuing human interaction 
with the natural and celebrating human destruction of the natural.66 The Lake District is included in the 
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List as a ‘cultural landscape’, on the basis that it ‘exhibit[s] an important interchange of human values, 
over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology, 
monumental arts, town-planning or landscape design’; is ‘an outstanding example of a type of … 
landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history’; and is ‘directly or tangibly 
associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of 
outstanding universal significance.’67 The (draft) decision of the World Heritage Committee captures the 
sense in which the Lake District is an artifactualisation, socialisation and humanisation of the natural, 
explaining that ‘[t]he harmonious beauty of the English Lake District is rooted in the vital interaction 
between an agro-pastural land use system and the spectacular natural landscape of mountains, valleys and 
lakes of glacial origin’, adding that ‘[t]his landscape is an unrivalled example of a northern European 
upland agro-pastural system based on the rearing of cattle and native breeds of sheep’.68 George Monbiot 
is less celebratory, describing the Lake District’s inclusion in the List as ‘a betrayal of the living world’ 
and noting that the Lake District’s ‘high fells’ have been ‘reduced by sheep to a treeless waste of cropped 
turf whose monotony is relieved only be gullies, exposed soil and bare rock’.69 
7. Art / Nature / Simulacrum  
A significant and relatively recent literature suggests that, in a post-work, post-human future of 
automation and artificial intelligence human beings themselves risk conversion into artifacts by artifacts – 
robots, computer chips, and virtual reality machines – they have created.70 Humans will be ‘upgraded’ 
and de-humanised as ‘[n]ew tools … become parts of our bodies: we will have bionic hands, feet and 
eyes.’71 This de-humanisation of humanity would, in a sense, be the ultimate fulfilment of Benjamin’s 
story of the Fall. Humanity’s detachment from nature, its loss or lack of a ‘paradisiacal’ of ‘perfect 
knowledge’ would, via the artifactualisation of the natural, and in particular the use of silicon (which is, 
of course, a naturally occurring element) in the silicon chip, result in the loss of any vestige of the natural 
in the human.72   
Whilst we humans seem, then, to have developed the capacity to artifactualise ourselves, we 
apparently lack the capacity to connect with the natural-ness of the natural, something I became 
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particularly conscious of when attempting to make a clay model of the Horniman Walrus. I was asked to 
do this by the convenors of the ‘Pop-Up Museum of Legal Objects’ at the Socio-Legal Studies 
Association conference in Newcastle, in April 2017, and to take my model with me as an aid to the 
presentation of my paper – an early version of this article – at the conference.  
At first I was sceptical about the value of making a model of ‘my’ object, and my ability to do it, but as 
I handled the modelling clay and tried to create an approximation of the photograph of the Horniman 
Walrus on the Horniman Museum’s website I began to see parallels between what I was doing and what 
the walrus’ taxidermist had done in the late-nineteenth century. On one view the fact that the taxidermist 
was working with skin and bone means that he was somehow closer to the walrus than I was, as I worked 
with clay. But maybe there is an argument that I was closer to the walrus, truer to its nature, and to nature, 
because I was using the walrus as an object to tell a story about the imbrication of international 
environmental law in the artifactualisation, socialisation and humanisation of the natural – a story perhaps 
in defence of the natural.  
The difficulty, it seems, is that the ‘real’ walrus is not available for representation – as Jacques Lacan 
puts it, ‘the real … resists symbolisation absolutely’.73 Putting the walrus on show, first at the Colonial 
and Indian Exhibition in 1886, then at the Horniman Museum, and latterly at Turner Contemporary, 
involves turning it / ‘him’ into an it / ‘him’ by killing it / ‘him.’ Any attempt to engage with the natural 
will involve a similarly violent process of artifactualisation, socialisation and humanisation,74 for ‘man 
rejoices and basks in his conquest by turning it into the definition of the conquered thing: what has 
happened to it must be presented, by the thing, as its “in itself”’,75 or, in other words, the Horniman 
Walrus must be presented as ‘a walrus’ because we cannot exhibit any more accurate vision of a walrus. 
It seems we live, as Fredric Jameson argues, in the age of the simulacrum, ‘the identical copy for which 
no original has ever existed.’76  
The only way forward seems to be an ever greater process of socialisation, humanisation and 
artifactualisation.77  How, after all, could anyone human doubt the value of a never-ending effort to 
subject everything that is to ever greater levels of human control, ordering and possession? What 
 11 
 
alternative is there? We are, it seems, all collectors, and ‘for a collector … ownership is the most intimate 
relationship that one can have to things.’78 
 But whilst there may be no ‘fit for purpose,’ marketable alternative – a system or model of life that 
does not artifactualise, socialise, collect(ivise), and humanise the natural – that does not mean that no 
work towards an alternative should be undertaken.79 It is, rather, evidence that ‘if thinking is to be true – 
if it is to be true today, in any case – it must also be a thinking against itself’.80 Whilst we might enjoy the 
walrus in the Horniman Museum, complete with twitter account and soft toy available from the gift shop, 
we might also try to imageine an alternative exhibit, with the walrus in the centre, a packet of 
‘Horniman’s Pure Tea’ to the right, and a copy of the text of CITES on the left. And, if we can imageine 
this, we might ask ourselves how this re-imageined exhibit can prompt forms of ‘thinking against’.81 
Would it be a natural history exhibit, a work of art, or some kind of legal object? Does it matter?   
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